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Daily, media reports on countries eagerly introducing advanced surveillance tech-
nology to counter the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g. Byers 2020, Doffman 2020; 
Holmes 2020, Stojanovski 2020). The critics and commentators focus – rightly – 
on multifaceted dangers lurking behind the technological optimism, which drive 
our hopes of  defeating the pandemic (e.g. Cahn and Veiszlemlein 2020; Ikeda 
2020; Swire 2020). Majority of  the critical voices concerns the future risks, and the 
(unintended) consequences of  the implemented products, which do their (intend-
ed) job. But some technological interventions not only have unintended conse-
quences, they simply do not work. A case in point: a Polish bugged app. Consider-
ing this app, I invite the readers to a discussion about how a bugged app may im-
pact social relations, citizen’s wellbeing and sense of  (in)security in the already dis-
turbed political and health context. 
In Poland, until the 31st of  March 2020, persons covered by a 14-day compulsory 
quarantine  had two choices: daily police check(s) or surveillance using a special 1
 Not complying with the quarantine rules results in fine from 500 PLN ($118) up to 30.000 PLN ($7300). 1
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mobile app. But on that day, the government imposed emergency legislation and 
the app was made compulsory for every person in registered isolation (with few 
exceptions, such as visual impairments). The app requires people in quarantine for 
COVID-19 to periodically send selfies on request to prove they are not violating 
isolation. The procedure sounds simple: you install the application on your smart-
phone, allow access to the location of  the device and take a selfie. Several times a 
day, at different times, users receive a notification to confirm that they are in a 
quarantine. The application is connected to the data registry of  people quaran-
tined. On this basis it verifies whether the address and image of  the person in the 
register coincides with the one from which the device transmits. 
The information about the purpose of  the app is not clear and the official mes-
sages are conflicting. On the one hand, the Ministry says it is designed to help the 
persons in quarantine to connect to required services and gather information 
about the COVD-19, on the other – if  not more frequently – it emphasizes that it 
is designed to relieve police in verifying if  the quarantine rules are not violated 
(Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji 2020a, 2020b). Clearly, this is an app of  distrust. 
The app was developed by the Ministry of  Digital Affairs (Ministerstwo Cyfryza-
cji) in cooperation with the Ministry of  Health and commercial actor TakeTask . 2
Kwarantanna Domowa (Home Quarantine) is a modified app created for market re-
search and task management in large companies, allowing, for example, ordering 
specific activities such as taking a picture of  a shop window or placing products on 
the shelves. In the original app agents turn into mysterious clients. In Kwarantanna 
Domowa, the customer is the state while the agent is the person quarantined (Sute-
niec 2020).  
Last week, the Ministry emphasized that the installation of  the app was voluntary, 
and it existed as an alternative and supplement to the random checks of  quaran-
tine compliance by the police and sanitary department. Piotr Mieczkowski, man-
aging director of  the Digital Poland foundation said: ‘It is worth noting that in Poland 
the use of  this application is voluntary and if  someone does not trust the state, they do not have to 
use it’ (Sutaniec 2020). However, the app is now mandatory and as pointed out by 
the Panoptykon Foundation, such a solution potentially breaks with the Polish con-
stitution, particularly if  the code of  the app is not open (Szymielewicz and Obem 
2020). It is also alarming that police required the installation, falsely informing 
citizens before the legislation passed. As one user commented: ‘Today I also received 
information from the police that “since yesterday there is an obligation to install the application, 
even if  it does not work properly, please install”’. 
 TakeTask has now earned 2,5 million PLN ($610.000) from this project (Szczygiel 2020).2
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Information pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Digital Affairs 
Anatomy of Risks 
Not unlike other surveillance initiatives, this governmental project suffers from a 
lack of  transparency. For instance, the app has wider rights and functions than 
mentioned in the regulations on the governmental website or those attached to the 
app. We learn about them from the permissions in the Google Play/App store and 
from IT experts reading the codes. Tomasz Zielinski (Zielinski 2020) dissecting the 
codes found also that the app is integrated with Facebook libraries and a media 
player. The Ministry has not answered if  the app communicates in any way with 
the Facebook infrastructure.  
The commercial version of  the app, on which Kwarantanna Domowa is based, 
says that all data sent by the users is automatically collected on a dedicated server. 
However, nobody knows where it is located and to whom it belongs, and to my 
knowledge the Ministry has not answered these questions either. While some insti-
tutions such as the Central IT Center, General Police Headquarters, Voivodship 
Police Headquarters, Voivods or Center for Health Care Information Systems can 
be associated with the epidemiological objective of  the app, it may be different 
with the intelligence agency. This access is not mentioned in the application regu-
lations either. In Poland, as soon as state security is at stake, the scope of  regula-
tions, statutes and ordinances that protect the rights of  citizens is limited. The In-
telligence agency is not covered by any provisions regarding the protection of  per-
sonal data. In practice, this means that they can obtain all information they con-
sider useful for carrying out their tasks. If  the location data and photos sent by 
users of  the app are kept longer by any of  the authorized institutions, the intelli-
gence agency may intercept them for other purposes (Szymielewicz and Obem 
2020). For example, to train algorithms for facial recognition without users’ 
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knowledge and consent, a situation with a long and documented history (e.g. 
Captcha or FaceApp). 
The data obtained by the app will be stored for six years. The Ministry of  Digital 
Affairs has lately assured that at least photos of  users will be deleted after quaran-
tine (Szymielewicz and Obem 2020). However, the ministry announced that the 
app is voluntary, which already a week after its launch is in question. In the con-
text of  a government with authoritarian tendencies, which does not refrain from 
breaking human rights, constitution, constantly undermine the rule of  law and 
judicial independence (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2019), the anxiety of  misusing 
the data and risk of  algorithms being used in a completely different context (e.g. 
identifying protesters) is justified. 
For now, however, let us look away from the legal aspects of  the app and dangers 
of  future misuse, and look at some current societal consequences of  the state’s 
blind faith in technology and datafied knowledge. 
 
Screenshots from tutorial issued by the Ministry of Digital Affairs: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4&v=Wg_SsmkHU7M&feature=emb_-
logo 
Governing Bugs 
After downloading the app and filling out personal information, the user is in-
formed that they will randomly receive two SMS daily requiring to “complete the 
task” (take selfie, confirming their location). A quick look on the comment section 
at the Google Play and Appstore as well as first reports in media reveals the frus-
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tration among many of  the now more than 30.000 users of  the app . As one of  3
the users warned: ‘It’s bugged as hell. Don’t install it. Just nerves and waste of  time. I am 
deleting it’. Opting out of  the app is not possible, however: 
You cannot. It’s a one-way ticket. If  you have already decided on 
this form of  control in this extraordinary situation, you must use 
it until the end of  the 14-day period. Uninstalling the applica-
tion from your phone will not do anything, because text mes-
sages with reminders will still be coming (Warsinski 2020). 
 
Screenshot from tutorial issued by the Ministry of Digital Affairs:   
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4&v=Wg_SsmkHU7M&feature=emb_-
logo 
The Countdown of Care and Punishment 
The way the public institutions marked the app indicates that it is not designed as 
a tool for care. The aesthetics of  fear and panic is striking too. Elements such as 
frequently used exclamations marks and capital letters reminding of  charging the 
phone and not muting the device, as well as red colored warnings about informing 
police or ‘the system’ (unclear which system) are dominating. These are symbols of  
threat, sending signals opposite to sense of  security and undermining the impres-
sion of  the police or ‘the system’ as caring partners. As one of  the users comment-
ed: 
The app focuses on control and potential punishment, not on 
supporting and reassuring me that I’m doing right. And the 
 The number will surely raise significantly after the app is no longer voluntary.3
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worst is the text, which is supposed to support: ‘By using the app, 
you protect your loved ones.’ No, staying at home can protect 
someone, using the app does not guarantee it. 
Further, the app does not provide necessary contacts if  a user needs one. The func-
tions such as contact with social workers, psychologists or help with grocery shop-
ping are not working: ‘I have not been contacted by the services I requested’, ‘Useless. A clas-
sical scarecrow, additional control over society.’ 
For a person in quarantine with the app, at a random point of  the day (or even 
night), the text massaging avalanche starts: The first SMS reads that the user has 
20 minutes to ‘complete the task’. After 10 minutes, new SMS alarms ‘10 minutes 
to completing the task’. After that, SMS reads ‘You have not completed the task, 
information is set to the system’.  
 
Screenshot from tutorial issued by the Ministry of Digital Affairs:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4&v=Wg_SsmkHU7M&feature=emb_-
logo 
This countdown is particularly stressful to the users:  
The app shows the task to be completed (selfie) 14 minutes after 
receiving the text, i.e. 6 minutes to complete the task. This is 
very stressful because it brings us closer to the chance of  not do-
ing it due to lack of  time. Despite the selfie made and sent, I re-
ceived a text saying that the task was not completed. What 
should I think about it? 
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Reportedly, the app often does not register the tasks or after sending out SMS re-
questing the task, the app says ‘no more tasks’. For many, ‘It’s very stressful as you have 
limited time to complete it, but you can’t even do it.’ Users felt frustrated and disappointed 
as the app unnecessary puts them under suspicion: 
Me and my wife are in quarantine and we installed this app – 
only one check worked so far – others not. Getting SMS about 
new 20 min task and app says you don’t have new tasks. And 
later you receive SMS that you didn’t accomplish check in – in-
formation was passed to the system. It’s a bit stressful as we real-
ly are sitting at home without throwing our trash for one week 
already. Come on people! 
Available Citizens 
Because the app is constructed around the randomness and stressful counting 
down, the users’ needs to adjust their (already disturbed) daily routines to it. Some 
users report that the regulations mention 1-2 SMS daily, while they receive up to 
4-5 requests daily and feel therefore forced to hold the phone next to them all the 
time, which is distressing for many reasons. In addition, the app’s requirements of  
constant availability make citizens discipline and adjust their bodies and its needs 
to the double-policing (SMS and police visiting). Such as users reporting sleeping 
over the SMS or ‘failing task’ because of  changing diapers or taking shower. One 
user received a phone call from a friend: ‘After the conversation I look at the text 
saying that I missed this time and my inactivity has been reported. – It scared me.’ 
Other user was so worried about missing the next task that she stopped taking her 
naps despite her bad health. In addition to the fact that psychological stress that 
can manifest itself  physically deteriorating already weak health, sick citizens re-
frain from recommendations concerning how to take care of  themselves during 
the crisis. This puts in question if  the app is an appropriate tool for caring for pub-
lic health. It surely has potential of  causing harms. 
“I don’t lie, data do” 
The most common is location error. The tool is inaccurate, and the range of  ac-
ceptable GPS position is confusing, which may give an impression that the person 
submitting their photo has left the quarantine location. Despite the error not being 
solely a failure of  the app itself, but rather depending on the equipment used by 
the person, it still puts the whole project into question:  
Using it is practically impossible. Even though I am sitting at 
home all the time, it displays error 463, which suggests that I am 
in a different location. I wanted to support the control services, 
but it is impossible. 
As there is no information available to the user regarding period of  quarantine, 
the user experience inaccuracies and sense of  confusion: 
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How do I know if  this is consistent with my calculations?? I got a 
text message a few days after crossing the border! The chaos is 
because the sanitary department and police have different 
ranges. I don’t know which period is registered in the applica-
tion, and even if  I knew there is no way to change it. 
These examples illustrate too perils of  technology and data-driven governance. 
The burden of  proof  is now on the individuals. In a context of  the increasing faith 
in data as ‘evidence’ and an unerring tool of  control and decision making, the in-
dividuals already exposed to, for instance political persecution or prejudice, may 
be subjected to unjust treatment. 
Technostress and Techno-insecurity 
In their recent update of  the app governmental website, the Ministry added the Q 
& A section responding to the feedbacks on app crushing. It reads: 
If  after closing the application completely (so that it does not run 
in the background) this error repeats, you need to enter the 
phone settings, and then go to Manage applications / Installed 
applications / Applications (the name depends on the phone 
model). In the application list, find the ‘Home Quarantine’ ap-
plication and then clear the application data. On some phone 
models, after entering the application you have to go to the de-
fault memory to clear the data. If  that does not help, uninstall 
and reinstall the application. The same should be done when 
error 472 appears and the message: ‘This task is already started. 
Finish or continue’ (Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji 2020b).  
In other words, the state requires from the citizens digital competence and skills, 
but also a significant investment of  time in order to satisfy the requirements and to 
fix the bugs. I appreciate that the situation is extraordinary, and it requires ex-
traordinary measures and efforts from institutions and individuals. However, such 
a requirement of  individual responsibility for the technopolitical challenge is dis-
turbing. 
The app increases techno-stress among citizens who are nervous and confused 
about the situation, anxious about losing their race with the app, and not being 
able to cope with it in a healthy manner (see Brod 1984). This case brings also a 
new dimension to the phenomenon of  techno-insecurity, which is usually associat-
ed with situations where people feel threatened about losing their jobs to other 
people who have a better understanding of  new gadgets and computing devices 
(Tarafdar et al. 2007). Here, the threat is equally real, but the fear regards being 
visited by the police, receiving fine or having their data misused. 
Yes, people in Poland report about police visiting and checking the situation any-
how, but receiving an individual message informing about person’s individual fail-
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ure reported to ‘the system’ is experienced as more disturbing than the sight of  the 
police on the streets: 
It’s not like I am afraid of  the police, they are OK. But this 
whole situation makes me anxious. You know, the SMS telling 
you that you did not complete the task so the system will know. 
This gives me bad associations. 
The Double Burden of Control 
The double-policing regards not only the ways the Polish government has chosen 
to check if  the quarantine rules are obeyed, but also the double usage of  resources 
due to the buggy app. Either because of  ‘not completing the task’ or despite doing it 
several times a day, some people are visited by the police every day. The most iron-
ic is that the same citizens installed this app to relieve the police. Here is a sample 
of  experiences illustrating the local challenges for both police and the app users: 
I have the impression that the amount of  police checks I have 
increased with this application. Today, until 13:30, I had 3 pa-
trols. 
The app as such is all right and it worked well. But the local po-
lice doesn’t know it exists and they keep coming to check us 
anyway. 
I have been using [the app] for 5 days, I take a selfie and the po-
lice visit me anyway because they are not connected to the ap-
plication! Why add the stress and extra work? 
Useless app, police is checking me daily so now I’ve got a double 
nuisance. 
There are no official reports from the police departments, however it seems legit to 
assume that the broken technology causes additional workload for the police offi-
cers. 
Bugs of Trust 
‘We have created this application to make the mandatory home quarantine easier’, explained 
Minister of  Digital Affairs Marek Zagórski (Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji 2020b). So 
far, this technological solution has not achieved this goal. On the contrary, it 
makes the citizens living in already disturbing situation, more stressed and anx-
ious. When proposing a new control tool, democratic governments must consider 
whether the intrusive means are the only way to achieve the goals. The Polish gov-
ernment has not yet provided any evidence that Kwarantanna Domowa is sensible 
and effective. As far as users’ experience tell, rather than facilitating the fight 
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against a pandemic, it makes daily life of  the police forces and citizens in quaran-
tine more difficult and unbearable emphasizing that the state treats them with 
genuine suspicion. As the bugs increase so does the distrust toward the govern-
ment’s response to COVID-19 and towards its ability and willingness to solve the 
crisis. 
Researchers and politicians around the globe are engaged in constructing models 
and prognosis for the development of  COVID19, as well as predicting effects and 
side-effects of  the introduced measures. The critical investigation and predictions 
of  the technology-based measures should be included in these discussions. In soci-
eties with a reciprocal distrust between the state and the citizens, the technological 
failures accelerate the dysfunctional character of  pandemic measures. 
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